Haystack

A multi-purpose mobile vantage point in user space

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Part I Background



...but can we trust them?

- Privacy violations
- Malicious apps (ransomware, spyware, ...)
- App permission overuse
- Insecure operation

Investigation implies trade-offs





Tradeoffs: ISP traces



- Large scale
- Real-world traffic



- No context
- Encryption a problem

Tradeoffs: instrumented devices





- Device context
- Real-world activity
 Tricky setup
- Comprehensive analysis

- Small scale

[OSDI'10, IMC'13, CoNEXT'13]

Tradeoffs: static analysis



- Large scale
- Sufficient for some analyses



No organic user activity

[NDSS'11, CCS'12-13, MobiSys'15]

Tradeoffs: proxy MITM





- Real-world traffic
- Comprehensive analysis

- No device context
- Detoured routes
- Higher trust hurdle

[CoNEXT'12, C2BID'15]

Tradeoffs: crowdsourced active measurement



- Large scale
- Comprehensive analysis



No organic user activity

[CoNEXT'14, MobiSys'15, HotMiddlebox'15]

Can we do better?

Part II The Haystack app

A few observations

- We want to run on the device
 - Best access to device context and the user
- We do not want to root the device
 - Drastically limits and skews deployment
- We like crowd-sourced measurement
 - Demonstrated large scale in Netalyzr

MHMM...


IPNS.


Android's VPN API

- VPN apps don't require rooting
- Access to all packets sent by the device
- Nobody says you have to tunnel them!
- Instead inspect & rewrite, and interact directly with intended destination

The Haystack app

A user-centric, on-device measurement platform platform that intercepts and inspects network traffic and app activity in user-space.













Non-encrypted Traffic
Encrypted Traffic
Off-path channels








Polling state machine




Polling state machine




Part III Evaluation


CPU and power overhead



CPU and power overhead




CPU and power overhead




Power: +3.1% when idle, +9.1% when busy


Latency overhead



Latency overhead




Throughput



Part IV Use cases


Pilot study 450 users, 1340 apps, 6 months, app-focused data collection

Traffic properties



- Less than 20% of apps only send cleartext
- 22% of flows are encrypted
- 59% of TLS-using apps allow MITM
- 40 apps generate local IoT traffic

Privacy-related leakages



App properties

- 15% of apps do not come from Google Play
 - Pre-installed or from other stores
 - They create 22% of the observed traffic
- 78% use third-party trackers
 - Advertising, analytics, social net interactions, ...

https://haystack.mobi/panopticon

The ICSI Haystack Panopticon

Android App

What is a panopticon?


Use touchpad/mouse wheel for

Search (app/tracker)

Help us to find more



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Future work

- More direct user involvement
 - Notify of leakages as they happen
 - Highlight third-party footprint
- Alter / block traffic
 - Suppress third-party trackers
- Reactive measurement
 - Active measurement can give context or inform traffic alterations

Summary

The Haystack app

A user-centric, on-device measurement platform based on the Android VPN API



Access to organic user activity



Optionally inspects TLS



Has full device context



Enables user interaction



No rooting required, thus scalable



(Modest) performance overheads



Subject to crowdsourcing biases

Thanks!

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